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Abstract
In this paper we propose to augment a modern neural-
network architecture with an attention model inspired by hu-
man perception. Specifically, we adversarially train and an-
alyze a neural model incorporating a human inspired, visual
attention component that is guided by a recurrent top-down
sequential process. Our experimental evaluation uncovers
several notable findings about the robustness and behavior
of this new model. First, introducing attention to the model
significantly improves adversarial robustness resulting in
state-of-the-art ImageNet accuracies under a wide range of
random targeted attack strengths. Second, we show that by
varying the number of attention steps (glances/fixations) for
which the model is unrolled, we are able to make its defense
capabilities stronger, even in light of stronger attacks — re-
sulting in a “computational race” between the attacker and
the defender. Finally, we show that some of the adversarial
examples generated by attacking our model are quite differ-
ent from conventional adversarial examples — they contain
global, salient and spatially coherent structures coming from
the target class that would be recognizable even to a human,
and work by distracting the attention of the model away from
the main object in the original image.
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen great advances in the use and
application of deep neural network models. From large scale
image classification [21] to speech recognition [25], the per-
formance of these models has steadily improved, making
use of new hardware advances, more memory and better op-
timization strategies. The leading model paradigm for such
tasks, however, has not changed significantly since the origi-
nal AlexNet paper [31]. Models are still, predominately, built
in a purely feed-forward manner, interleaving convolutional
layers (often with small kernels with limited support) and
simple non-linearities [40]. Recently introduced ResNets
source: wallet
target: beaver
ResNet-152
 250 PGD steps 
top-1: beaver top-1: beaver
S3TA-8 (Ours)
 250 PGD steps 
top-1: wallet
Figure 1: We augment a modern neural network with a
sequential top-down attention model for image classification.
The model achieves state-of-the-art adversarial robustness
against PGD attacks and the resulting adversarial images
are often human interpretable. On the left is a source image
(label:wallet) — both an adversarially trained ResNet-152
and our model classify it correctly. In the middle and on the
right are adversarial examples produced by a 250 step PGD
attack against each model (target class is beaver). Both
models fail to defend against the attack and predict the target
class as their top-1 output. However, while the attack image
for the ResNet contains no visible interpretable structure, the
attack image for our model contains a salient and coherent
image of a beaver’s head (best viewed zoomed in on screen).
[22], which are some of the most powerful models we use
currently, have not changed this scenery significantly.
While there is no doubt that these models are very suc-
cessful in solving some tasks, concerns have been raised
about their robustness and reliability [36, 49]. Small, care-
fully chosen perturbations to the input, often imperceptible
to a human observer, may cause these models to output in-
correct predictions with high confidence [49]. These kind of
perturbations are called adversarial examples [18, 49] and
are a subject of ongoing research [4, 9, 56].
The current paradigm of neural network models has cer-
tainly been inspired by the human and primate visual system
[44]. Early predecessor models have directly made this con-
nection, and there is a line of work which connects between
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the activations of such neural network models and the neu-
ral activity in brains [8]. These parallels between models
and biological vision systems apply mostly to early vision
processing [14] – and specifically, the feed-forward process-
ing which happens in time-limited scenarios [14]. This has
been discussed in several intriguing works, including in the
adversarial examples context.
There are, however, some major differences between feed-
forward neural network and the primate visual system. The
eye in primates has a fovea which samples different regions
of the visual input field at different spatial resolutions [16].
Furthermore (and possibly tightly connected to the fovea) the
system has a strong attentional bottleneck which has been
researched in many different works [45, 7]. The visual cortex
has many feedback and top-down recurrent connections [41]
and it is not purely feed-forward. Additionally, humans
don’t view images as a static scene, but explore the images
in a series of saccades/fixations, collecting and integrating
information in the process [34]. This has been postulated
to cause humans to report different classification mistakes
which are qualitatively different than those of deep neural
networks [13].
In this work we propose to use a soft, sequential, spatial,
top-down attention mechanism (which we abbreviate as
S3TA) [39], drawing inspiration from the primate visual
system. While we do not presume this to be a biologically-
plausible model in any way, we do propose that this model
captures some of the functionality of the visual cortex,
namely the attentional bottleneck and sequential, top-down
control. We adversarially train the model on ImageNet im-
ages, showing that it has state-of-the-art robustness against
adversarial attacks (focusing on Projected Gradient Descent
or PGD [32, 36] attacks). We show that by increasing the
number of steps we unroll the model, we are able to better de-
fend against stronger attacks – resulting in a “computational
race” between the attacker and the defender. Finally, but
importantly, we show that the resulting adversarial examples
often (though not always) include global, salient structures
which would are perceptible and interpretable by humans
(Figure 1). Furthermore, we show that the attack often tries
to attract the attention of the model to different parts of the
image instead of perturbing the main object in the source
image directly.
2. Related Work
Adversarial training: Adversarial training aims to cre-
ate models that are robust to adversarial attacks. At their core,
techniques such as the ones of [18] and [36] find the worst
case adversarial examples at each training step (using Fast
Gradient Sign Method or PGD attacks) and add them to the
training data. Models created by [36] have been shown to be
empirically robust on MNIST and CIFAR-10. [28] proposed
using Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) to encourage the logit
predictions of a network for a clean image and its adversarial
counterpart to be similar. However, ALP performs poorly
under stronger attacks [15]. [56] proposed feature denois-
ing networks together with adversarial training to achieve
strong performance on ImageNet [12]. Other methods like
[20] achieve gradient obfuscation more explicitly by adding
non-differentiable preprocessing steps. Although these gra-
dient masking techniques make gradient-based attacks fail,
more sophisticated adversaries, such as gradient-free meth-
ods [51, 2], can circumvent these defenses.
Recurrent attention models: Attention mechanisms
have been widely used in many sequence modeling prob-
lems such as question-answering [24], machine translation
[6, 52], video classification and captioning [46, 33], image
classification and captioning [37, 11, 17, 1, 55, 60, 53, 5, 57],
text classification [58, 47], generative models [42, 59, 30],
object tracking [29], and reinforcement learning [10]. We
build out model based on the one introduced in [39] and
adapt and modify it for ImageNet scale image classification.
The model uses a soft key, query, and value type of attention
similar to [52, 42]. However, instead of using self -attention,
where the queries come from the input directly, this model
uses a top-down source for them generated by a LSTM (see
Section 3 for details). Furthermore, the output of the atten-
tion model is highly compressed and has no spatial structure
other than the one preserved using a spatial basis. This is
unlike self-attention where each pixel attends to every other
pixel and hence the spatial structure is preserved. Finally,
it applies attention sequentially in time similar to [57], but
with a largely different attention mechanism. See Section 3
for full model details.
Adversarial robustness with attention: There has been
some work studying the use of attention to strengthen classi-
fiers against adversarial attacks. [35] uses foveation-inspired,
manual image cropping to reduce the impact of an adversar-
ial perturbation on ImageNet classification accuracy. [54]
tries to regularize the activations of a classifier by applying
a hard mask generated from an adversarial-perturbed form
of the image. The hope is that the use of a mask to occlude
important parts of the image builds robustness to perturba-
tions. Recently it has also been shown that “squeeze and
excite” [27] self attention can help in classifying “Natural”
adversarial examples [23]. We evaluate our model on this
dataset in Section 5.4.
3. Model
We base our model on the one proposed by [39] for rein-
forcement learning and we adapt it to ImageNet scale image
classification. The model sequentially queries the input, ac-
tively attending relevant pieces of spatial information at each
time step to refine its estimate of the correct label. The
two key components are the sequential nature of the model
and the top-down, attentional bottleneck, both of which we
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Figure 2: A general view of the sequential top-down atten-
tion model. The input image is passed through a ResNet to
produce a keys and a values tensor. We concatenate a fixed,
predefined spatial basis to both. A query vector is decoded
from an LSTM state and an inner product between it and the
keys vector is calculated at each spatial location. A softmax
is then applied to produce an attention map. This attention
map is point-wise multiplied with the values tensor, and the
result is summed spatially to produce an answer vector. This
answer vector is the input to the LSTM at this time step. The
LSTM output is then decoded into class logits to produce the
output of the classifier. More than one query vector can be
produced at each time step (resulting in a matching number
of answer vectors).
empirically show contribute to its resilience to adversarial
attacks.
We briefly highlight the important components of the
model, illustrated in Figure 2. For full details, we refer the
reader to [39] and the supplementary material. The model
starts by passing the input image through a “vision” net —
a convolutional neural net (here we use a modified ResNet-
152, see below). We use the same input image for all time
steps, so the output of the ResNet needs to be calculated
only once. The resulting output tensor is then split along
the channel dimension to produce a keys tensor and a values
tensor. To both of these tensors, we concatenate a fixed
spatial basis tensor which encodes spatial locations using
a Fourier representation. This spatial basis is important
because our attentional bottleneck sums over space causing
the spatial structure of these tensors to disappear and this
basis allows passing on spatial location information.
We unroll the top-down controller for several compute
steps, attending the input at each step and processing the
answer through the controller to produce the output (or next
state). The Top-Down controller is an LSTM core [26]
whose previous state is decoded through an a “query net-
work”, an MLP, into one or more query vectors. Each query
vector has the same number of channels as the keys tensor
plus the number of channels in the spatial basis. We take the
inner product between the query vector and key and spatial
basis tensor at each spatial location, resulting in a single
channel map of attention logits. We pass these through a
spatial softmax to produce the attention map for this query.
The resulting attention map is then point-wise multiplied
with the values tensor (and the spatial basis). Note that a
single map is used for all channels, we note the importance
of this below. The multiplied value tensor is summed across
the spatial dimensions to produce an answer vector, one for
each query. These answers are fed into the LSTM as the
input for the current time step (concatenating them if more
than one is used). Finally, the output from the last LSTM
output is decoded into class logits through an MLP. The
cross-entropy loss w.r.t to the ground truth class is calculated
with this output. The initial state of the LSTM is also learned.
Since the model is fully differentiable, we train it end-to-end,
including the ResNet, with adversarial training (as described
in Section 4.1) and 5.
Several important points regarding our version of the
model in this context:
• The attention bottleneck makes the decision of the
model depend on potentially large extents of the image.
This can be due to the shape of attention map at every
time step, as well as the fact that these maps can change
considerably between time steps. This should cause a
local adversarial perturbation [38] to be less effective.
We discuss this in Section 6 and show that indeed, we
often observe that global perturbations are required by
the attacker for the attack to succeed.
• Following the last point, the fact that the attention map
has a single channel which modulates all value channels
together constraints the content of these channels to be
spatially coherent. In a regular ResNet architecture the
last block output is read with a average pooling done
independently on each channel - this allows the network
to lose spatial structure by the time information reaches
this last layer.
• In order to make the spatial element, and hence the
effect of the attention bottleneck more pronounced we
modify the ResNet architecture to make the final output
have larger spatial dimensions. This is done by chang-
ing the strides to 1 in all but the second residual block.
For ImageNet input (224 × 224 pixels) the resulting
map is 28 × 28 pixels large (as opposed to 7 × 7 in a
regular ResNet).
• The top-down nature of the attention mechanism is
such that the queries come from the state of the LSTM
and not from the input. Hence, the model can actively
select relevant information depending on its internal
state, rather than just the input. This allows the model
to take its own uncertainty, for example, into account,
when querying the image and producing the output.
• The sequential nature of the model allows for increasing
computational capacity without changing the number
of parameters. We demonstrate that this helps with
robustness in Section 5.
4. Adversarial Risk
We define adversarial risk in the context of supervised
learning formally in this section. Given a model mθ
with parameters θ, we want to minimize the loss ` on in-
puts x and labels y sampled from the data distribution D.
Formally, the objective is to minimize the expected risk:
E(x,y)∼D `(mθ(x), y). Empirically, we optimize the empiri-
cal risk on a finite training set and estimate the expected risk
over a held-out test set using the average loss.
As pointed out in [51], models with low expected risk may
still perform poorly on any data points. In situations where
a single catastrophic failure is not allowable, the empirical
risk estimate may be problematic. Hence, we also need
to consider the worst-case risk for the desired robust mod-
els: sup(x,y)∈suppD `(mθ(x), y), where suppD denotes the
support of D. In practice, computing the supremum over the
input space is intractable as the search space is exponentially
large in the dimension of x. We can instead use the local
adversarial risk, as a proxy for the worst-case risk:
E
(x,y)∼D
[
sup
x′∈N(x)
`(mθ(x
′), y)
]
, (1)
where the neighborhood N(x) denotes a set of points in
supp(D) within a fixed distance  > 0 of x, measured by a
given metric. The adversarial risk enables us to approximate
the worst-case risk in a tractable way. For example, we
can use off-the-shelf optimization algorithms (such as PGD
[32, 36]) to find the supremum over the neighborhoodN(x).
In this paper, we consider the specification that the image
predictions should remain the same within an `∞-ball of
an image x, where an allowable maximum perturbation is
 = 16/255, relative to the pixel intensity scaled between 0
and 1.
Specifically, we focus on the ImageNet dataset [12] and
we primarily consider the targeted PGD attack as the threat
model, where the targeted class is selected uniformly at ran-
dom, following [2, 28, 56], given that the untargeted attacks
can result in less meaningful comparisons (e.g., misclassifi-
cation of very similar dog breeds) on ImageNet.
4.1. Adversarial Training
To train models that are robust to adversarial attacks, we
follow the adversarial training approach by [36] and more
recently [56].
Following the adversarial risk in Eq. (1), we want to
minimize the following saddle point problem:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ) = E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
x′∈N(x)
`(mθ(x
′), y)
]
.
(2)
where the inner maximization problem is to find an adver-
sarial perturbation of x that can maximize the loss; the outer
minimization problem aims to update model parameters such
that the adversarial risk ρ(θ) is minimized.
In our experiments, we approximate the solution to the
inner maximization problem with PGD. Specifically, we per-
form PGD on the cross entropy loss described using iterative
signed gradients as in [32, 56]. During training, we use tar-
geted PGD attacks, where the targeted class is selected at
random uniformly, following [28, 56].
4.2. Adversarial Evaluation
In this paper, we use the PGD attack to evaluate the model,
which is regarded as a strong attack1 in the community and
several published papers use this as their benchmark.
In cases where we cannot take analytic gradients, or
where they are not useful, we can approximate the gradients
using gradient-free optimization. The use of gradient-free
methods lets us verify whether robustness stems from gradi-
ent obfuscation by the model architecture. In this work, we
use the SPSA algorithm [48], which is well-suited for high-
dimensional optimization problems, even in the case of noisy
objectives. We use the SPSA formulation in [51] to generate
adversarial attacks. In the SPSA algorithm, it first samples
a batch of n samples from a Rademacher distribution (i.e.,
Bernoulli ±1), namely, v1, . . . , vn ∈ {1,−1}D. Then, the
SPSA algorithm approximates the gradient with finite differ-
ence estimates in random directions. Specifically, for the i-th
sample, the estimated gradient gi is calculated as follows:
gi =
f(xt + δvi)− f(xt − δvi)
2δvi
where δ is the perturbation size, xt is the perturbed image at
the t-th iteration, and f is the model to be evaluated. Finally,
SPSA aggregates the estimated gradient and performs pro-
jected gradient descent on the input xt. The whole process
iterates for a predefined number of iterations.
5. Experiments
In this section, we empirically study the robustness of
S3TA on the ImageNet dataset [12]. For convenience, we
denote S3TA-k to be a S3TA model that is unrolled for
k time steps and evaluate S3TA-2, S3TA-4, S3TA-8, and
S3TA-16.
1Note that PGD is not necessarily the most suited attack for sequential
models, but for lack of better alternative we use it with large number of
steps.
We follow the training procedure used in [56], including
learning rate schedule, label smoothing, attack type during
training and evaluation procedure. We find that training with
a somewhat lower learning rate (0.2 initial learning rate) and
a smaller batch size (1024) is more stable for our model.
Training S3TA-16 is more challenging than the other models
due to the length of the unroll. In order to train it we start
by reading off the output from the 4th step for the first 35
epochs, 8th step for the next 35 epochs and 16th step for the
rest of training. All models are trained for 120 epochs. We
train the model on 128 Google Cloud TPU v3 cores. Training
takes between 42 and 70 hours, depending on the number of
unroll steps. We use a ResNet-152 as the vision-net of the
model (see Section 3) setting all strides to 1 other than the
second residual block. This results in larger spatial support
for the ResNet output (28 × 28 pixels) The recurrent core
is an LSTM with 1024 hidden units, the query network and
the output MLP are both with a single hidden layer of 1024
units. All the activation units used are ReLUs. The attention
model uses 4 attention query heads in all experiments here.
5.1. Random targeted attacks
The first set of models was adversarially trained with
10 PGD steps. These are generally weaker models than
models trained with 30 PGD steps (see below) but they take
less time and resources to train. Figure 3 shows the top-
1 accuracy of these models for the ImageNet test dataset
under a wide range of random targeted PGD attack strengths
compared to a ResNet-152 baseline (also trained with 10
PGD steps during adversarial training). With only 2 steps
of attention the weakest model here, S3TA-2, only has a
chance to send two queries, one before it even sees the
image, and one after processing the answers from the first
step. This puts emphasis on the attention bottleneck itself
rather than the sequential nature of the model. As can be
seen, the bottleneck itself already allows to model to improve
significantly upon the ResNet-152 baseline.
By increasing the number of attention steps we can im-
prove adversarial accuracy even further: unrolling for 16
steps (S3TA-16) significantly improves robustness - a S3TA-
16 model is more robust against a 1000 PGD attack steps
than a ResNet-152 model is against a 100 attack steps. In
fact, a S3TA-16 model trained with 10 PGD steps during
adversarial training is more robust than a ResNet-152 trained
with 30 PGD steps (see Figure 4). This shows that there is
a kind of “computational race” here between the strength
of the attack and the number of compute steps we allow
the model to have. More computation steps for the model
mean better defense against stronger attacks. Going beyond
a 1000 attack steps does not change the picture as most mod-
els saturate close to their 1000 step performance. Full results,
including attack success rates, and nominal accuracies, can
be found in Table 1 and the supplementary material.
Figure 3: S3TA-2, 4, 8 and 16 vs. ResNet-152 top 1 accuracy
on the ImageNet test set.. All models were adversarially
trained with 10 PGD steps. Note how the introduction of
the attention model significantly improve performance even
with 2 attention steps, and that adding more steps (S3TA-16)
improves performance further: a S3TA-16 model is more
robust at a 1000 attack steps than a ResNet-152 model at a
100 attack steps.
Figure 4: A S3TA-16 model adversarially trained with 30
PGD steps vs. ResNet-152 (30 steps) and DENOISE [56] top
1 accuracy on the ImageNet test set. DENOISE is the current
state-of-the-art on ImageNet and as can be seen S3TA-16
performs significantly better than both models, setting a new
state-of-the-art.
We now turn to compare models adversarially trained
with 30 PGD steps. These models are much stronger gener-
ally and achieve good robustness results across a wide range
of attack strengths, but require a great deal of resources and
time to train. Figure 4 shows the top-1 accuracy of a S3TA-
16-30 model (“-30” denotes 30 PGD steps during training)
vs. a ResNet-152 model and DENOISE [56], the latter be-
ing the current state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness. As
can be seen, S3TA-16 comfortably outperform both models,
setting a new state-of-the-art for random targeted attacks.
Figure 5 shows the attack success rates for all models dis-
cussed so far. When evaluating defense strategies, measuring
Figure 5: Attack success rates for all models presented
(lower is better). The main effects observed for top 1 accu-
racy hold here: more attention steps lower the attack success
rate and more PGD steps during training help reduce it even
further. S3TA-16-30 clearly has the lowest attack success
rates, about 25% lower than DENOISE while nominal accu-
racy is similar (see 1)
attack success rates makes sense when nominal accuracies of
models are high and comparable. For all models presented
here this is true (see Table 1). Note that the results hold for
this measure as well - more attention steps help reduce attack
success rates, and more PGD steps during training help. The
success rate of attacks against S3TA-16-30 is about 25%
lower than that of DENOISE (lower is better).
5.2. Untargeted and gradient-free attacks
Most robustness measures in the literature are for targeted,
gradient based attacks. However, a model that is only robust
against targeted attacks is weaker than one robust against
untargeted attacks [15]. In Table 2, we report results for
untargeted attacks using 200 PGD steps for S3TA-16-30
vs. ResNet-152, DENOISE and LLR [43]. Our model is
very competitive in this setting, both for  = 4/255 and
 = 16/255.
We also explore gradient-free methods to make sure the
model does not obfuscate gradients [51, 3]. Specifically, we
use random targeted SPSA [51] with a batch size of 4096 and
100 iterations under  = 16/255 for the gradient-free attack.
We use iterative signed gradients [32, 56] with gradients
estimated by SPSA. Results on a subset of 1000 randomly-
chosen images can be seen in Table 3. We can observe
that SPSA does not lower accuracy compared to gradient-
based attacks. This provides an additional evidence that the
model’s strong performance is not due to gradient masking.
Given SPSA’s adversarial accuracy is weaker (that is, all
models defend better than with gradient-based methods)
the performance difference between the models is not very
informative.
5.3. Loss landscapes
Another way of making sure gradients are not obfuscated
is by visualizing the loss landscapes [43, 50]. Figure 6 shows
the top-view of the loss landscape for S3TA-4 and S3TA-16.
To visualize the loss landscapes, we change the input along
a linear space defined by the worse perturbations found by
PGD and a random direction. The u and v axes represent the
magnitude of the perturbation added in each of these direc-
tions respectively and the z axis represents the loss. For both
panels, the diamond-shape stands for the projected L∞ ball
of size  = 16/255 around the nominal image. We can
observe that both loss landscapes are rather smooth, which
provides an additional evidence that the strong performance
is not because of gradient obfuscation.
5.4. Natural adversarial examples
A recent interesting dataset is “Natural adversarial ex-
amples” [23]. This curated dataset is composed of natural
images of a subset of 200 classes from ImageNet. These im-
ages are chosen such that they cause modern image classifier
to misclassify an image with high confidence, even though
no actual modification to the image is done. The images of-
ten contain objects in unusual locations, photographed from
unusual angles or occluded or corrupted in a variety of ways.
We compare a S3TA-16 model to DENOISE, the ResNet
baseline and the “Squeeze and excite” [27] (ResNet+SE)
variant reported in the original paper. Figure 7 shows the re-
sults, using the measures used in the paper: Top-1 accuracy,
Calibration error which measures the difference between
the confidence of each model and its actual error rate, and
AURRA which allows calculation of accuracy while giving
classifiers an opportunity to abstain if they are not confident
in their prediction.
6. Analysis
We have shown that the sequential attention model im-
proves robustness against a variety of attacks and attack
strengths. Furthermore, we have seen that we can increase
accuracy and defend better against stronger attacks by un-
rolling the model for more time steps. We now turn to
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Figure 6: Loss landscapes for S3TA-4 (left) and S3TA-16
(right). The surfaces are approximately linear meaning there
is no significant gradient obfuscation.
10 steps 100 steps 250 steps 1000 steps
Model NominalAccuracy Top-1
Attack
Success Top-1
Attack
Success Top-1
Attack
Success Top-1
Attack
Success
ResNet-152 70.66% 53.48% 7.63% 36.91% 43.48% 32.50% 50.93% 29.5% 55.84%
S3TA-2 72.30% 55.08% 9.06% 40.13% 40.31% 36.56% 46.56% 33.97% 50.40%
S3TA-4 72.48% 56.78% 9.10% 42.54% 39.37% 40.00% 44.33% 37.99% 47.50%
S3TA-8 72.14% 56.02% 9.50% 42.63% 39.06% 40.17% 44.01% 38.48% 47.09%
S3TA-16 72.54% 57.45% 9.33% 44.19% 38.83% 40.71% 44.82% 38.70% 48.16%
ResNet-152-30 63.62% 53.30% 6.56% 39.56% 34.62% 37.56% 38.68% 36.18% 41.37%
DENOISE 66.02% 56.33% 5.00% 45.84% 27.36% 44.19% 30.66% 43.39% 32.54%
S3TA-16-30 64.55% 55.08% 3.79% 47.18% 21.87% 46.65% 23.52% 46.11% 24.91%
Table 1: Full results for all models on random targeted PGD attacks with the ImageNet test set, with different number of attack
steps. Bottom three rows are models trained with 30 PGD steps, the rest were trained with 10 PGD steps.
Model Top-1  = 4/255 Top-1  = 16/255
ResNet-152 39.7% 6.3%
DENOISE [56] 38.9% 7.5%
LLR [43] 47.0% 6.1%
S3TA-16 46.75% 9.8%
Table 2: Top-1 accuracy under untargeted attacks at 200 PGD
steps. As can be seen, our model is very competitive with
existing methods though not optimized for this particular
attack method.
Model Top-1 Attack Success
ResNet-152 61.90% 2.20%
DENOISE [56] 63.70% 1.90%
S3TA-16 59.60% 1.90%
Table 3: Top-1 accuracy under random targeted SPSA at-
tacks (batch size of 4096 and 100 iterations). SPSA is a
gradient free method which provides evidence whether gra-
dients are obfuscated. As can be seen all models perform
similarly, considering they all defend better here than the cor-
responding gradient based attack (making the actual reported
number less informative).
Figure 7: Results of our model on the “Natural Adversarial
Examples” dataset. Our model achieves better top-1 accu-
racy, and better AURRA (see text for details) than both a
ResNet-152 and DENOISE. Squeeze and excite outperforms
our model in all measures.
analyze some of the properties of the resulting attack images
and strategies.
Figure 8 shows several examples of generated adversarial
examples for different attack strengths for an adversarially
trained S3TA model (with 4 unrolling steps) and an adver-
sarially trained ResNet-152. We observe that often (but
certainly not always, see below) the generated image con-
tains salient structures related to the target class. However,
while the nature of these perturbations is local at best for
the ResNet examples, for S3TA global, coherent and human
intrepretable structures appear. This sheds some light to
the internal reasoning process of our model, hinting that it
reasons globally, across space, in a coherent manner. It’s
important to note that in many cases the adversarial exam-
ples do not appear to contain any salient structure (even with
many attack steps). They do appear much more often mid-
way through training the model, while the model is already a
very good classifier but still not at the peak of its robustness.
Towards the end of training it seems that it is harder to gener-
ate these, possibly as part of the defense strategy the model
learns. See the supplementary material for some examples
generated midway through training, as well as more visi-
ble and invisible perturbation images. Understanding under
what circumstances these examples appear is left for future
research.
6.1. Distracting the Attention
Since attention is an integral part in our model, we can
see whether it plays a role when the network is attacked and
mislabels an image. We can visualize the attention maps
generated at each time step and see how the attention is
used under different attack scenarios. Figure 9 shows such
attention maps for an image used to attack a S3TA-16 model.
Attention is superimposed over original image - highlighted
areas are more attended than dark areas. As can be seen, the
attack can create stimuli which attract the some the attention
heads away from the main object in the image, in this case
towards something that slightly resembles the target class in
the background.
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Figure 8: Adversarial images generated by PGD to attack the ResNet-152 and S3TA-4 model. The source label is depicted on
the left, the target label on the right. Source images are the leftmost column. We generate examples for 10, 100, 1000 and
10,000 PGD steps. Note how for the examples shown here, the perturbations are quite visible for both models (not surprising
in light of the strength of the attack). However, the perturbations generated to attack the ResNet model are mostly local,
comprising at best of disconnected visible features related to the target class. On the other hand, the examples generated
to attack S3TA contain global, coherent and human interpretable structure. Note the 3D structure and spatial extent of the
locomotive (top-left), the coherency of the king snake on the ground (bottom-left), the camel head on the bark of the tree
(top-right) and the beagle and the man appearing (bottom-right). These structures appear mostly when there are already
existing features in the image which can be used to form the target class, and the model uses them in a global, coherent manner.
Images are best viewed on screen and zoomed in.
Indigo Bunting Bloodhound Attention steps 
Figure 9: Attacks attract attention away from the main object. Here we see the source image (left) attack image (target class
bloodhound) and the 4 attention heads of the model as they unroll through 16 steps. Some of the heads still attend the main
object from the source image, however some of the heads are attracted away towards a group of branches in the background.
Upon close inspection it does seem that these branches resemble a bloodhound dog in the attack image. Though this structure
is not very salient to humans, it is enough to attract the attention away and cause the model to mislabel the image. Best viewed
on screen and zoomed in.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a recurrent attention
model inspired by the primate visual system is able to
achieve state-of-the-art robustness against random target ad-
versarial attacks. Allowing for more attention steps improves
accuracy under stronger attacks. We show that the resulting
adversarial examples often (but not always) contain global
structures which are visible and interpretable to a human
observer.
Why is it that global structures arise when attacking a
model like this? We postulate that there are two contributing
factors. The attention mechanism pools data from large
parts of the image, which means that the gradients propagate
quickly across the whole of the image, and not just locally.
Furthermore, because the the model is unrolled for several
steps, more parts of the image may be potentially attended
to and thus gradients may propagate there. We see evidence
for this in the fact the often the attacker attracts the attention
away from the main object in the image, hinting that the
attention plays a crucial role in the attack strategy.
There is still a lot of work to be done to achieve
adversarial robustness in complex datasets. Even mod-
els like the proposed one often fail when the attacker is
strong enough, and performance is still quite low com-
pared to nominal accuracies, but at some point we may
ask — if an image has been perturbed enough such that
it does not resemble the original image and looks like
another image coming from the target class, is it still a
valid adversarial perturbation? Models like the one pre-
sented here may allow us to reach that frontier in the fu-
ture.
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A. Model details
A.1. Detailed model overview
Here we detail and expand on the specifics of the model
described in the main paper. For a more thorough overview
and discussion, we refer the reader to [39].
Figure 10 depicts the model in full detail. On the left
is the unrolled compute graph for a 4 step model. On the
right is a detailed overview of the attention mechanism for a
single attention head.
The model is comprised of two main components - a
“vision net” component which processes the input image
and outputs a spatial tensor (of size 28 × 28 in this case)
and a “controller” component, which is a recurrent core
attending this tensor at every time step. On the left of Figure
10 we can see the image being processed through the vision
net (ResNet-152, in this case) and the output tensor being
produced. This happens only once per image since the input
image is fixed for all compute steps. At the top we see the
controller (in this case an LSTM) unrolled. A learned initial
state is used for the first time step. At each time step the
model attends the vision nets’ output tensor, sending out a
query vector(s) and receiving an answer vector(s) to process.
At the final step we read out the controller’s state, pass it
through an MLP and produce the class logits.
The right side of Figure 10 depicts the inner workings of
the attention mechanism. The output tensor from the vision
net is split into two tensors along the channel dimension. The
first Ck channels (Ck = 32 in all our experiments) are used
as the “keys tensor” (of size 28× 28× Ck). The rest of the
channels are used as the “values” tensor with Cv channels
(Cv = 2016 in all experiments, tensor size is 28× 28×Cv).
To both the keys and values tensors we concatenate a “spatial
basis” tensor of size 28× 28× Cs. This fixed tensor allows
the attention to preserve and query about spatial information
after the spatial structure is lost (see below).
We produce a “query” vector by passing the previous
controller state (together with the last time step’s logits)
through a “query network” (an MLP). This query vector is
of size 1× 1× (Ck +Cs). We take the inner product of the
query vector with each spatial position in the keys tensor to
produce a 28× 28 single channel attention logits map. We
pass this logits map through a spatial softmax to produce the
final attention map for this head.
We broadcast the attention map along the channel dimen-
sion and point-wise multiply it with the values tensor. The
result is then reduce summed along both spatial dimensions
to produce the “answer” vector of size 1× 1× (Cv + Cs).
The importance of the spatial basis becomes clear at this
point, since the summation causes all spatial structure to be
lost.
We concatenate all answer vectors together with all query
vectors and use these as inputs to the controller at the current
time step. We pass the controller state through an MLP to
produce the class logits. If it is the last time step, we produce
the final class logits and the loss is calculated from them.
A.2. Model parameters
We now give the full details of model parameters. Unless
otherwise noted all non-linear activations are ReLUs. All
learned parameters are initialized randomly.
A.2.1 Vision net
For the vision net we use a standard ResNet-152 V2. We
change the stride to 1 in all residual blocks other than the
second one and we don’t use the final linear layer. The output
of this network for a 224× 224 image is a 28× 28× 2048
tensor.
A.2.2 Controller
The controller is a standard LSTM with a hidden size of 1024
units. The initial state is randomly initialized and learned
with the rest of the network.
A.2.3 Query network
The query network is a standard MLP with one hidden layer
of size 1024. Its input is the same size of the controller state
plus the size of logits (2024 in our case). Its output size is
(Ck + Cs)×N where N=4 is the number of heads we use.
The spatial basis has 64 channels, hence the total output size
is 384 (with 32 key channels).
A.2.4 Output MLP
This is a single hidden layer MLP with 1024 units in the
hidden layer. Its input is the hidden state of the controller
and its output is 1000 units large (i.e. number of classes).
A.2.5 Spatial Basis
The spatial basis is a fixed tensor of size 28× 28× Cs. We
use spatial sine and cosine functions to form the basis, with 4
frequencies per dimension resulting in Cs = (2× 4)2 = 64
channels.
B. Training and evaluation details
We follow the training and evaluation protocol of [56] in
most parameters. We use a gradient descent optimizer with
momentum. We use a lower learning rate of 0.5e−1 scaled
by a batch size of 256. For our models we use batch size of
1024 so the initial learning rate is 0.2. We warm start for the
first 5 epochs and then anneal the learning rate (with a factor
of 1e−1) after 35 epochs, 70 epochs and 95 epochs. We train
for 120 epochs.
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Figure 10: Full model details. Left - high level overview of the recurrent mechanism (for a 4-step model) and the corresponding
vision net. Right - a zoomed in detail on one attention step. See text for full details.
The attack during training is random targeted PGD with
signed gradients. We use  = 16, random initialization
probability of 0.8 and step size of 1/255. The loss function
for adversarial training is only on adversarial examples, there
is no loss coming from clean images. We add L2 weight
decay loss with weight 1e− 4, and label smoothing of 0.1.
We use the same attack in evaluation, with step size of 1/255
for all number of steps other than 10 where we use 1.6/255,
again following [56].
C. Additional results
In Table 4 we report results on extra strong attacks with
5000 and 10,000 steps — due to the cost of evaluation we
evaluated only on 2200 random images from the ImageNet
test set, but in our experience numbers change very little on
larger evaluation sets.
C.1. PGD attacks with multiple restarts
Here we test the three strongest models against attacks
with multiple restarts. We test with the same PGD with
signed gradient attack used so far (with a 100 and 1000
steps) but we allow the attacker to start from multiple random
initialization: 1, 10 or 100. We take the strongest example
from all restarts to measure the top-1 and attack success rate
(i.e. even if one of the adversarial attacks succeeds we count
it as a success, and if the network mislabels a single image
out of the attacks we do not increase the top-1 score). Results
are reported in Table 5. As can be seen, all models are quite
robust to multiple restarts, and S3TA-16-30 is better than the
other models.
C.2. Random targeted attacks with an Adam opti-
mizer
It has been observed [19] that random targeted attacks
using the FGSM method are sometimes weaker than attacks
optimized with the Adam optimizer. Here we test the per-
formance of the model with this potentially stronger type of
targeted attack. We use a 250 step attack, optimized with the
Adam optimizer with learning rate annealing (0.1 until step
100, 0.01 until 200 and 0.001 for the last 50). This has been
shown [19] to be quite a strong attack. Results are reported
in Table 6. As can be seen all models perform worse here
than with PGD with iterative FGSM, however S3TA-16-30
is significantly more robust here as well.
D. More adversarial examples
D.1. Non visible examples
Figure 11 shows adversarial examples for a S3TA-4
model where there is no visible structure to be seen, as
is often the case with fully trained models.
D.2. Structured examples - mid training
Figure 12 shows adversarial examples for a S3TA-16
model around half-way through training, with clear salient
global structures. These are much more common before
training concludes (but still appear in fully trained models as
in the main paper). Understanding the exact circumstances
under which these appear is an open question.
5000 steps 10,000 steps
Model Top-1Accuracy
Attack
Success Rate
Top-1
Accuracy
Attack
Success Rate
ResNet-152 28.12% 58.03% 27.64% 58.79%
S3TA-2 32.85% 52.50% 32.63% 52.94%
S3TA-4 35.67% 50.57% 35.43% 50.96%
S3TA-8 36.20% 50.75% 35.44% 51.91%
S3TA-16 37.36% 49.50% 36.96% 50.23%
ResNet-152-30 36.69% 41.33% 36.78% 41.25%
DENOISE 42.76% 33.83% 42.99% 33.88%
S3TA-16-30 46.11% 24.91% 46.20% 24.68%
Table 4: Results for extra strong PGD attacks with 5000 and 10000 steps. The general picture remains as S3TA-16-30 is
significanly more robust than all other models. S3TA-16 trained with 10 PGD steps is more accurate than a ResNet-152 trained
with 30 PGD steps even under these powerful attacks.
Attack steps 100 steps 1000 steps
Random restarts 1 10 100 1 10 100
ResNet-152-30 39.77% 39.37% 39.15% 37.41% 36.51% 35.75%
DENOISE 46.16% 44.68% 44.68% 43.57% 41.91% 41.37%
S3TA-16-30 47.76% 47.27% 47.09% 46.74% 46.09% 45.78%
Table 5: PGD attack with multiple restarts. We test the various method under attacks starting at multiple random initialization
points. We test with 100 and 1000 PGD attack steps, initialized at 1, 10 and 100 random starting points. We count the attack
successful even if only one of the adversarial examples caused the model to output the target class. We only count an image to
be correctly classified if it was correctly classified across all adversarial images. As can be see, all models are quite robust
here, though again, S3TA-16-30 outperforms them all.
Top-1 Success rate
ResNet-152-30 26.38% 42.94%
DENOISE 32.99% 35.04%
S3TA-16-30 36.83% 27.00%
Table 6: Random targeted PGD attack with Adam optimizer. We measure the robustness of some models under an random
targeted attack optimized with the Adam optimizer (rather than iterative FGSM). The attack uses 250 iterations, with learning
rate 0.1 for the first 100 iterations, 0.01 for next 100 and 0.001 for the last 50. This has be shown [] to be a stronger attack the
iterative FGSM. As can S3TA-16-30 is significantly better at defending here compared to the other models.
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Figure 11: Adversarial images generated by PGD to attack the ResNet-152 and S3TA-4 model with no apparent visual
structure. The source label is depicted on the left, the target label on the right. Source images are the leftmost column. We
generate examples for 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000 PGD steps. These are cases where the perturbation does not have clear
structure, as for many of the images. Some local structure may be interpretable - tiles for the washbasin for example, but
there’s little coherent global structure. Images are best viewed on screen and zoomed in.
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Figure 12: Adversarial images generated by PGD to attack the ResNet-152 and S3TA-4 model with clear and intrepretable
structure. The source label is depicted on the left, the target label on the right. Source images are the leftmost column. We
generate examples for 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000 PGD steps. While the ResNet attacks are not particularly interesting, the
S3TA examples are extremely structured. Note the salient, global and often realistic structures appearing - the Junco bird, the
head of the Iguana, the body of the Indian Cobra or the Water Ouzel, a bird which is often depicted next to water (which is
also created). We encourage the reader to view these on screen and zoomed-in.
